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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: SELF-DETERMINATION
AND THE CONSENT POWER: THE ROLE OF THE
GOVERNMENT IN INDIAN DECISIONS
Charles Scott *
The Basis and Scope of the Consent Power
The United States government, through its delegated officials such
as the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs,' has broad authority over the "management of all Indian
affairs and of all matters arising out of Indian relations."' This
broad power, commonly referred to as the "plenary power," has
traditionally furnished a mandate for nearly total control over
many aspects of Indian life.3 One aspect of the plenary power is
the requirement that many Indian decisions, both tribal and in-
dividual, must secure the approval of the government before they
become effective. Specific statutory examples include the approval
of all contracts with Indian tribes,4 approval of tribal membership
rolls for trust asset distribution, approval of wills disposing of
trust or restricted property,' approval of sales or mortgages of
trust or restricted land, and approval of tribal constitutions and
bylaws8 of tribes organized under the Indian Reorganization Act
(hereafter referred to as IRA). 9 In addition, further consent power
is vested in the government under the terms of nearly all of the
tribal constitutions of groups organized under the IRA. For exam-
ple, most constitutions give the Secretary of the Interior" power to
rescind all tribal ordinances and resolutions "for any cause,"" and
often give the Secretary veto power over the expenditure of even
nonrestricted tribal funds,'2 although these powers are not
statutorily required. Both the granting of these additional
powers and the fact that nearly all of the tribal constitutions
employ identical language are not surprising because nearly all of
the constitutions were prepared by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(hereafter referred to as BIA) and its attorneys. As Homer Jenkins,
who heads the Tribal Programs Branch of the BIA, stated in
testimony before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Judiciary Committee:
These constitutions, which are complex legal documents,
were not an Indian invention .... Rather, they were the pro-
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duct of exhaustive study by the legal officers of the
Department .... This accounts for the great similarity in the
documents .... The Bureau of Indian Affairs, through its
field staff, wrote most of the tribal enactments."
The effect of inserting these additional nonstatutory requirements
was to further cement BIA control over tribal decisions in the very
documents that were intended to restore self-control and initiative
to the tribes and to remove the former "paternalism and
oppression.""
The consent power is particularly dangerous inasmuch as there
are few standards for the control of its exercise. The Code of
Federal Regulations gives a few general guidelines,'" and by law
consideration must be given to certain aspects of leases before ap-
proval is granted.16 However, by and large, the scope of the
Secretary's discretion in vetoing Indian decisions is not specifically
delineated. In order to understand the possible limits and controls
over this seemingly absolute power, it is necessary to briefly ex-
amine the origins, history, and present state of the relationship
between the government and the Indians.
Sources and Evolution of the Consent Power
The history of the white man's dealings with the Indians has
been one of oppression, false dealings, and massacre.' 7 The early
legal notions of the Indian tribes as semisovereign and respected
nations, as expressed in the early Marshall Court opinions," was
at odds with the ruthless expansionism and "manifest destiny"
concepts illustrated by the Removal Act. 9 The United States im-
posed its sovereignty over the Indian lands and people through
military, economic, and colonial force, treating the Indians in
general as a conquered and inferior race."0 This power-based sub-
jugation led to the concept of the so-called "plenary power" over
Indian affairs.
At the same time, however, another concept was interwoven: a
quasi-humanitarian concern for the welfare of the people who had
been reduced to a desperate condition by both the actions and in-
action of the government.2' The government's policy of separation
was replaced by one of eventual assimilation, culminating in the
Ceneral Allotment Act of 1887.' Pending full assimilation, the
government assumed the role of a protector and guardian for the
Indian people.' This "wardship" analogy, which had first been
suggested in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia," gained popularity as
the actual sovereign power of the Indians waned, to the point
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where Congress eventually chose not to acknowledge tribes as
sovereignties for treaty purposes.' The "wardship" idea was
judicially developed in such cases as Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock and
Rainbow v. Young3 7 which expressed a "duty of care and protec-
tion owing to [Indians] by reason of their state of dependency and
tutelage."'
These two ideas, that of absolute plenary power over Indians
and that of a guardian-ward relationship for their protection and
benefit, merged into the awkward concept of a self-imposed
"trust" relationship, with a judicially recognized duty on the part
of the government to exercise its great authority only in the best
interests of the Indians. As it was expressed in Seminole Nation v.
United States 9 :
Under a humane and self-imposed policy which has found ex-
pression in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions of
this Court, [the Government] has charged itself with moral
obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. Its
conduct... should therefore be judged by the most exacting
fiduciary standards.-
Thus, as the legal role of the government evolved from that3 of a
conqueror to that of a protector, the Indians were given back
more and more of their former powers of self-government, under
such provisions as the IRA. However, as discussed above,32 the ex-
ercise of such power is usually effective only upon government ap-
proval. Theoretically, the consent power is exercised for the good
of the Indians, as required by the trust relationship. In practice,
the largely controlled consent power seriously limits the exercise
of self-determination and provides the government a potent tool
with which to control the Indian people for improper ends.
Problems With the Consent Power
Several specific problems are particularly troublesome under
the present system. The consent power requires affirmative
Secretarial action to implement Indian decisions, as opposed to a
general review/veto power. This can be used as a means of control
because withholding approval requires only inaction rather than a
specific disapproval, and can lead to the use of delaying tactics34 to
avoid the controversy that would be caused by an adverse deci-
sion. Because of the many levels of delegated Indian power, it may
take a great deal of time to secure any decision whatsoever. The
BIA-prepared tribal constitutions generally allow a total of 100
days-over three months-to the government to approve tribal
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1977
decisions.' After an adverse decision is rendered, the internal
review system, as set out in the Code of Federal Regulations, is ex-
tremely cumbersome and time-consuming. Evidently, no time
limit at all is imposed on decisions appealed to the Area Director
after an adverse decision by the local BIA official. 6 Appeals from
the Area Director's decisions to the Commissioner of Indian Af-
fairs can be held for 30 days without decision, then referred to the
Board of Indian Appeals for decision.37 The Board of Indian Ap-
peals procedure similarly seems to have no maximum time limit,"8
but would evidently take a minimum of 60 days for filing briefs,
answers, etc." Thus, it could easily take six months to a year for a
tribe to exhaust its administrative remedies, by which time the
issue could well be moot.
In the context of approving tribal attorney contracts, the delays
in pressing legal matters, coupled with the "pocket veto"
t:echnique of neither approving nor disapproving the contract, led
I:o the passage of Section 1331 of Title 25 of the United States
Code,"0 providing for automatic approval of the contract if no
decision is rendered within 90 days. The necessity for the law was
explained by Senator Sam Erwin in the bill's legislative history:
"Frequently, these delays in approving contracts extend for
periods exceeding a year and, consequently, impose so severe a
hardship upon tribes in need of counsel that they constitute a
denial of due process of law."" This is certainly a step in the right
direction. However, all other decision approvals are still subject to
the above-mentioned long delays, with no provision for such
automatic validation. In many situations, such as approval of
delicately negotiated multi-party business contracts where time is
a crucial factor, such delays amount in practice to an
unreviewable adverse decision.
Another problem with the consent power is its potential for
political misuse. Indian history is full of instances of "sweetheart"
contracts for mining and mineral exploitation approved by the
government, contrary to the Indians' best interests and for a frac-
tion of their true value.' 2 So long as the BIA is given final review
power over such contracts, it is likely that such situations will con-
tinue. Furthermore, there are conflicts of interest within the
Department of the Interior that make decisions in the Indians' best
interests unlikely. Within that Department, in addition to the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, are the Bureaus of Mines, Land Manage-
ment, Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, and Reclamation,'3 all of which
have substantial interests adverse to Indian rights." Such conflicts
result in decisions that compromise Indian interests rather than
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol5/iss1/6
carrying out the stated fiduciary duty to protect such interests
wholeheartedly, as in the Paiute Tribe's Pyramid Lake
controversy." The existence of these conflicts was recognized by
former President Nixon, who stated: "There is considerable
evidence that the Indians are losers when such situations arise."'
The consent power also suffers from the lack of articulated stan-
dards for review. These would logically be found in the Code of
Federal Regulations, but the few standards found there are of little
guidance. For instance, on the question of the qualifications of
tribal attorneys, the Regulations state only that the attorney must
be a "reputable member of the bar, and fully competent to carry
the case" through all appeals,47 thus leaving room for nearly total
governmental control. While standards are set forth for lease
approval, 8 these look only to the financial aspects and do not
specify guidelines for social, cultural, and other special
considerations. 9 The Secretary is given discretion to approve
leases which are not financially advantageous, but only when "in
his judgment such action would be in the best interest of the
landowners."' This gives the Secretary extremely broad power to
veto Indian decisions as to the social, cultural, or environmental
desirability of a lease perhaps not as lucrative as others.
The problem is not helped by the boilerplate language of the
tribal constitutions, most of which specifically allow the Secretary
to disapprove tribal decisions "for any cause."' Even if the
language has minimal legal effect (due to other laws and cases that
would require a minimally reasonable cause), it still represents an
underlying attitude of the government vis-a-vis the Indians that
must be considered.
This attitude itself is another drawback to the present situation.
By its existence and use, the consent power perpetuates the "suf-
focating pattern of paternalism" that has characterized the Indian-
government relationship." In essence, it treats the Indians as legal
incompetents whose decisions must be scrutinized carefully to
protect them from "their own improvidence and from over-
reaching by others."' While this view was widespread fifty years
ago, a sensitivity to the modern values of self-determination and
internal sovereignty would argue against the current use of the
consent power to protect a people who neither require nor desire
such two-edged "protection." It reduces the role of the tribal
government to little more than a "civics class," and demeans the
dignity of the Indian people and their tribal governments."
It can be argued that the government today is actively trying to
implement the current values of Indian self-determination by us-
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ing its disapproval power only in extreme situations.m Even if this
is true, and disregarding for the moment all of the other problems
discussed above, the continued existence of the consent power
represents a serious future threat. Many reservations contain
valuable mineral and energy resources. Historically, the govern-
ment has encountered little effective opposition to their
exploitation.' However, as self-determination increases, it seems
likely that the tribes will begin to resist resource exploitation
pressures, at the same time that the government becomes more
and more in need of the resources. The reserved consent power
could then be used to undercut Indian power gains and once again
allow the exploitation of the Indians' resources by refusing to ap-
prove antidevelopment Indian decisions.
Current Procedures for Review
ihternalAgency Review
As discussed earlier, one major problem with the consent power
is that it can be used to delay decisions to the point of mean-
inglessness. However, once an Indian decision has been formally
disapproved, questions of review of the adverse decision arise. As
with most agency decisions, exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a precondition to seeking judicial review.
The internal appeals procedure is found in the Code of Federal
Regulations." Basically, the adverse decision on the reservation
level is appealed first to the Area Director of the BIA, then to the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The Commissioner may either
decide the case, or refer the appeal to the Board of Indian Appeals
in the Department of the Interior for decision. 5 If it is decided on
the basis of the exercise of discretionary authority, the decision is
final for the Department of the Interior; if it is decided based on an
interpretation of law, the decision is appealable to the Board of In-
dian Appeals." That decision is then final for the Department.'
This administrative hearing procedure is cumbersome, time-
consuming, and lacks many features generally considered
desirable for such review.6 ' The only formal hearing provided for
is that of the Board of Indian Appeals to resolve a "genuine issue
of material fact. ' 62 All other decisions are made by departmental
officials rather than by a disinterested hearing officer. Pleadings
are written, without provision for oral argument, and appeals can
be summarily dismissed for procedural failings.6' Bonds, unlimited
in amount, can be required as a condition to the appeal."'
Throughout the proceedings, the burden is on the Indian to over-
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turn the disapproval, rather than on the BIA to justify its decision.
However, the procedure has survived due process challenges.6
Availability ofJudicial Review
The traditional view was that the Secretary had virtually
unlimited discretion in Indian matters by reason of his vested
authority and the nature of the government-Indian relationship,
and the Secretary's actions were not reviewable by the courts. As
it was stated in Rainbow v. Young:
There is no provision for a re-examination of the question of
fact so committed to him for decision, and, considering the
nature of the question, the plenary power of Congress in the
matter, and the obvious difficulties in the way of such a re-
examination, we think it is intended that there shall be none.6'
Under this view, the Indians' rights were seen as comparatively in-
significant: the Supreme Court observed in LaMotte v. United
States, referring to Secretarial lease approval: "Without doubt
the regulations prescribed operate to restrain the Indian from leas-
ing in his own way and on his own terms, but this is not a valid
objection." The discretion of the government was nearly absolute.
In Senate hearings on the IRA, Senator Wheeler observed that the
local Indian agent on a reservation had the power of a "czar."6 At
that time there was no "provision for appeal from the decision of
the Secretary giving the court revisory power.""
Even after the passage of the IRA and the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (hereafter referred to as APA),/' it was long held that
sovereign immunity, the plenary power, and the broad grant of
Secretarial discretion made Indian decisions generally
unreviewable. This was sometimes explained by virtue of the
curious "approval" structure: because the Secretary "may [as op-
posed to shall or must] ratify and approve amendments to the
tribal constitution," such actions were held discretionary and
hence not subject to APA review.'
Eventually, though, some courts began to examine Secretarial
decisions more closely. Oliver v. Udal,' 73 while refusing to over-
turn the Secretary's approval of a tribal ordinance, nonetheless ex-
amined the merits of his action before affirming the lower court's
summary judgment on mootness grounds. Udall v. LittelP' was
one of the first cases to review the Secretary's actions under APA
standards, although without any discussion as to the Act's ap-
plicability. There, the court upheld the right of the Secretary to
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cancel a tribal attorney's contract by administrative action for
good cause.
Many doubts concerning the reviewability of Secretarial action
were resolved by the Supreme Court in Tooahnippah v. Hickel."
While the case did not clearly establish standards for review, it
held that Secretarial action in disapproving an Indian will was
subject to review under the APA, overturning some lower courts'
holdings of nonreviewability.'
Tooahnippah involved the disposition by will of restricted
lands. Such wills are subject to approval by the Secretary under
Section 373 of Title 25 of the United States Code.7 The decedent's
will left his restricted land to his niece, and made no provision for
his adult illegitimate daughter. There was considerable conflict
concerning the daughter's true paternity, and the niece had
evidently taken the decedent into her home and provided for him
when the rest of his family had deserted him. The will was even-
tually disapproved by the Secretary for failure to provide for the
daughter, and the niece sought review of the disapproval.
Recognizing the conflict in the circuits on the reviewability of
such decisions, 78 the Court discussed the competing considera-
tions. Noting that the APA allows review except to the extent that
statutes preclude judicial review or the agency action is one com-
mitted to agency discretion, 7 and in view of the "presumption that
aggrieved persons may obtain review of administrative decisions
unless there is 'persuasive reason to believe' that Congress had no
such purpose,"'' the Court held that the action was reviewable
tinder the APA.
The Court did not discuss the problem of sovereign immunity.
There is a current conflict in the circuits on the issue of whether
the APA operates as a waiver of sovereign immunity." The
Supreme Court has been soundly criticized for its failure to resolve
the problem." For instance, in reply to a holding by the District of
Columbia Circuit that "the Administrative Procedure Act con-
stitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity,"83 the Court decided the
case on standing grounds, stating, "We do not reach the question
of... whether there is a statutory or immunity bar to this suit.""
Professor Davis points out that three circuits currently hold that
the APA constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity, and other
circuits have found ways around the doctrine when they wished to
CO so.'
The approach of the court in Littell v. Morton6 is illustrative of
a balancing approach that recommends itself as a reasonable com-
promise between the desirability of a decision on the merits and
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the policy of protecting the government from "substantial bother-
some interference."87 The court in Littell concluded that, while
sovereign immunity can sometimes apply independently of the
APA review provisions, a careful balancing of the values involved
favored full review. The Secretary's actions, if ultra vires as alleg-
ed for APA review, are not protected by the doctrine, and it is one
that has been under considerable attack in recent years,' especial-
ly as it relates to the APA. Noting the liberal application policy of
the APA and the general silence on the part of the courts as to
sovereign immunity problems, the court felt that even though the
doctrine was not totally rejected in this context, it was weakened
to the point that it would only be invoked in exceptional cases,
where review could seriously undermine the functions of the
government. 9 While the issue will not be settled until the Supreme
Court takes definite action, the trend of the lower courts has been
either to get around the doctrine by holding the APA to be a par-
tial waiver" or by ignoring the issue entirely.9
The separate problem of reviewability of an ordinary ad-
ministrative decision has been called "so difficult and complex that
it remains largely unsolved."92 The APA applies, except to the ex-
tent that agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.93
However, cases such as Tooahnippah, Littell9 and Akers9' sug-
gest that the courts are willing to review so-called discretionary
decisions in Indian matters more readily than those in other areas,
probably because of the underlying trust responsibility. Pro-
fessor Chambers has called such judicial review "clearly ap-
propriate" due to the underlying fiduciary duties.' The distinction
between review of ordinary and Indian decisions was expressed in
United States v. Seminole Nation." The court, in holding that
judicial review was appropriate, observed that "cases cited to us
by the appellant which serve to limit judicial review of ad-
ministrative decisions where that same element of 'trust' is lacking
are of little assistance here."99
The leading case on reviewability of discretionary decisions is
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe." Under Volpe,
reviewability turns on whether or not there is "law to apply."'
0
'
°
The vagueness of the standard has been criticized." It seems,
however, that in most Indian decisions, there is clearly "law to ap-
ply" so as to enable the courts to review the actions meaningfully,
either in the specific statutes requiring Secretarial approval"3 or in
the body of Indian case law and departmental precedents. In-
evitably, the decision by the courts to review administrative deci-
sions is often bottomed on policy determinations as to the ap-
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propriateness of such review.'" The historical willingness of the
courts to grapple with complex Indian legal questions"° indicates a
policy favoring judicial review and, because of the past treatment
of Indians, the courts have generally been willing to protect their
interests.'" While some commentators have suggested the
possibility of other means of attacking governmental decisions,17
the APA seems to provide the easiest and best-recognized means
of access to the courts in this area.
Standards for APA Review
The APA allows the court to compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed'" and to set aside actions found
to be "arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."' Conceivably, the first section could be used to compel an
approval decision in cases of unreasonable delay."' The main con-
cern, though, is the standard to which the Secretary will be held in
reviewing his adverse decision under Section 2(A).
Most cases use the terms "abuse of discretion" and "arbitrary
and capricious" nearly interchangeably. To be sure, these are
broad standards and they serve a basically conclusory purpose,
inasmuch as both serve as a shorthand way of indicating a finding
by the court that the agency action was improper or unreasonable
in the overall context. APA review operates as a check on other-
wise uncontrollable agency power. As Justice Douglas observed:
"Absolute discretion is a ruthless master. It is more destructive of
freedom than any of man's other inventions.."" At the same time,
of course, efficient administration requires a certain quantum of
discretion in. decision making, within the bounds of
reasonableness. In other words, agencies have only the authority
to exercise their discretion reasonably, and the basic question for
the reviewing court is whether the decision falls within the permit-
ted "zone of reasonableness."" If it is outside of this zone, it is
referred to as an "arbitrary and capricious" decision or an "abuse
of discretion. I'M
There are, of course, certain clear limits. Decisions made cannot
reflect improper purposes, " ' or be influenced by extraneous con-
siderations. On the other hand, a failure to consider relevant con-
siderations amounts to an abuse of discretion."' To provide a basis
for review, the official must articulate the rational basis for his
decision,"6 at least where there has been an adjudicatory hearing,
and possibly in other cases as well.
Indian decisions on review are subject to the statutory APA
review criteria. 7 Tooahnippah refused to define strictly the scope
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of the Secretary's power in holding that he abused it,"' but con-
cluded that under the facts the decision was "arbitrary and
capricious. ' .9 Justice Burger, writing for the majority, refused to
limit the Secretary's power of will approval to a determination
that the technical requirements of a valid testamentary instrument
had been met, but rejected the idea that the official could revoke
or rewrite a rational will based on subjective notions of equity and
justice, and in essence substitute his preferences for those of the In-
dian testator. He reasoned that the granting of the power of
testamentary disposition would be meaningless if the Secretary
had equal power to substitute his own judgment, but nonetheless
felt that there remained some sort of undefined subjective discre-
tion to disapprove dispositions "lacking in rational basis," even
though the will might be technically able to "pass muster in a con-
ventional probate proceeding.' 2 ° Justice Harlan, in a concurring
opinion, expressed general philosophical agreement with the idea
of limiting the Secretary's discretion to merely determining
whether the technical requirements of a will have been met, but
felt constrained on the basis of the legislative history of Section
373 to allow the Secretary some additional review power. The
overall holding is not a model of clarity. At least one court has in-
terpreted Tooahnippah to require approval of wills that violate
public policy but cannot be said to be clearly irrational.'2 On the
other hand, the Department of the Interior has interpreted
Tooahnippah as sanctioning disapproval "where approval of such
devise would be contrary to the public policy.""
Littell was similarly vague on the precise scope of the
Secretary's discretion, defining decisions as an abuse of discretion
if made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departing
from usual policies, or based on improper considerations-the
usual criteria.'2 ' Thus, as discussed above, the essential standard of
review of the Secretary's action is reasonableness in light of the
totality of the circumstances. Cases have not directly considered
the unique nature of the relationship between the government and
the Indian in analyzing the overall reasonableness of the decision,
using instead traditional discretionary standards applicable to or-
dinary government-citizen dealings. Recognition of the
uniqueness of the Indians' situation as a factor in the totality of
circumstances might well mandate a higher standard of review.
To ward a Higher Standard of Review
The government has a self-imposed trust obligation to the In-
dian people, and its actions are to be judged "by the most exacting
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fiduciary standards."' ' Such fiduciary standards require the deci-
sion to be made for the positive good of the Indian people, more
than conduct that is merely not arbitrary or capricious by or-
dinary standards.2 6 Failure to hold to such high standards can be
viewed as a violation of the government's responsibility, which
would itself be an abuse of discretion.' 7 The courts, in reviewing
the exercise of the trust responsibility, have the obligation to make
this determination," which involves more than just finding a ra-
tional basis for an Indian decision. As it was expressed in United
States v. Seminole Nation..: "A breach of that [fiduciary] obliga-
tion by the Government may obviously involve conduct less than
arbitrary, capricious, or fraudulent by an official charged with the
position of trust. Judicial review of the Government's actions,
whether they be termed discretionary or not, is called for in that
situation.""' While this case arose under the Indian Claims Com-
mission Act,"' and hence is not controlling authority here, it fur-
nishes a philosophical basis for a higher standard of review. Under
this view, cases limiting judicial review of other agency decisions
would be inapplicable, and a failure to consider the special status
of the Indian would be grounds for attacking the decision as a
breach of trust responsibility. This would require particularly
close examination in cases where there are conflicts of interest
within the Department of the Interior,3 2 and such dealings would
be "carefully scrutinized," giving "adequate weight to 'fiduciary
standards'.""
Secretarial disapproval of Indian decisions seems especially
vulnerable to judicial attack because disapproval of a decision
runs directly contrary to mandated goals of advancing self-
determination and tribal autonomy by placing greater decision-
making power in the hands of Indians. This has been the ar-
ticulated policy of the government since the enactment of the IRA,
one of the goals of which was to "get away from the bureaucratic
control of the Indian Department, and... give the Indians the
control of their own affairs and of their own property.""3 ' This
purpose of the IRA was recognized recently by the Supreme
Court.' 5 The present policy of the government is to "reject the suf-
focating pattern of paternalism"'3 6 by "encouraging Indians to ex-
ercise greater self-determination."'37 These values have been con-
sistently endorsed by the courts. In Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones"s the Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of the IRA
was to "disentangle the tribes from the official bureaucracy. " '
One of the clearest statements of the policy of self-government
was the opinion in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission,""
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which recognized the Indians as "a separate people, with the
power of regulating their internal and social relations."
1 4
Post-IRA legislation clearly indicates a congressional policy
favoring increased Indian self-determination. Such measures in-
clude the 1955 act allowing long-term leases of Indian land, 4 the
Indian Civil Rights Act, 4 3 and the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act.4
The latter includes a clear statement of congressional policy
favoring "meaningful Indian self-determination,"'1' and finds a
failure on the part of the government to allow Indians the "full op-
portunity to develop leadership skills crucial to the realization of
self-government." 6 It provides for grants for "strengthening"
tribal government. 47 The law's legislative history traces the con-
cept of tribal sovereignty, the problem of excessive BIA control,
and the current policies of self-determination. M It endorses the
concept of tribal sovereignty as an original reserved power, whose
exercise is not merely newly granted but is instead being
recognized, defined, and protected by current laws.
This impressive executive, congressional, and judicial recogni-
tion and endorsement of increased Indian rights to decision mak-
ing would seem to furnish a clear mandate to the Secretary to ad-
vance these goals whenever reasonably possible in the exercise of
his discretionary power. While the legislative history of many of
the consent power acts imply a broad grant of discretionary
power,' 9 the essence of legally allowable discretion is
reasonableness in the totality of the circumstances.' The changing
focus of government policy, while preserving the broad legal basis
of the discretionary power, serves to limit the exercise of that
discretion because the Secretary's overriding obligation is to use
his authority to carry out the proper purposes of the government.
Allowing the freest possible rein to Indian decision making, far
from being in competition with the plenary power, instead ad-
vances the unambiguous government policy of using the consent
authority to preserve and enhance true Indian self-government. In
other words, the Secretary still has the power itself, but his
superiors have clearly indicated that the power should be used to
advance rather than impede Indian self-determination.
Judicial recognition of this concept of a Secretarial approval
power limited by constraints of self-determination would in
essence shift the burden of justification of adverse decisions to the
Secretary. Because of the Secretary's high fiduciary duty to act in
the best interests of Indians, and the clear mandate to advance
self-determination by allowing Indians to make their own deci-
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sions free of bureaucratic interference, any disapproval of an In-
dian decision would require a very strong justification. Deference
to the values of Indian decision making should require something
along the lines of a "minimum-rationality" test, where an Indian
decision would be upheld if there was a conceivable rational basis
for it, and the reviewer-either the Secretary or the court-could
not overturn the decision merely because it might have been decid-
ed differently. This would protect the Indian people from
fraudulent or improper decisions by the tribal authorities, while
greatly strengthening the powers of self-determination.
Abolishing the Consent Power
The above discussion centers on changing the scope of the ex-
isting consent power to reflect current values of Indian self-
determination. These changes could be made without making
substantive statutory changes, relying instead on the judicial pro-
cess. However, this method has the disadvantage that the
statutory consent power remains. Future government policies may
not be so receptive to concepts of tribal autonomy, and the mere
fact of its existence might represent a temptation for future misuse.
Thus, it may be better in the long run to eliminate the consent
power itself.
It has been argued that doing so would be the functional
equivalent of the government's termination policies, the
"disastrous effects" of which are still being felt."' Few people today
would advocate the return of such a policy, which, while super-
ficially attractive as giving the Indians "true" self-determination,
actually operated to their disadvantage by forcing them into the
mainstream of society without adequate preparation, education,
or protection from unscrupulous whites.'" But removal of the con-
sent power is not in the same category as across-the-board ter-
mination, with the loss of support services, the possibility of loss
of land through tax debts, and all of the other problems. Instead,
it can be viewed as entirely consonant with the articulated goals of
"self-determination without termination."' 3 Many of the problems
of the 1950's termination can be traced to the abruptness of the ac-
tion: without education, without preparation, and without sup-
port or guidance, Indians were expected to assimilate into white
society.'" Today, many of these problems are being overcome
through a gradual transfer of powers and responsibilities to the
fribes,"5 an increased solidarity and cultural awareness on the part
of the Indian people, and a greater social sensitivity to the situa-
t:ion of racial minorities. Abolishing the consent power would not
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have the radical consequences of the 1950's termination because
the magnitude of the changes would not be so great and the In-
dians would be far better prepared.
One difficult problem is the need for the preservation of the
land base. In a sense, the government holds Indian land in trust
not only for the present generation of Indians, but for future
generations of Indians as well.'- Treaty language speaks of
perpetuity, implying a permanent commitment on the part of the
government."7 The land base protects the cohesiveness of the tribe
and, hence, its cultural identity. It serves as a buffer zone against
the pressures of the outside world, a condition perhaps necessary
to the continuation of tribal identity. Removing restrictions on the
land could result in the disappearance of Indians as a distinct
group, a loss not only to the Indian culture but to the dominant
American society as well because cultural differences are said to be
a "national resource.""
Thus, the question of the desirability of retaining some form of
government control over land base disposal"' is a complex one, in-
volving competing values of Indian autonomy and cultural preser-
vation. The retention of alienage controls implies a lack of faith in
Indian judgment in such matters; yet, on the other hand, the
dangers involved and the unique trust status of Indian lands
argues for extreme caution. Perhaps the decision should be made
by those most directly affected-the Indians themselves. Aside
from decisions directly affecting the land base, though, there ap-
pears to be little justification for continuing the consent power,
particularly in situations such as hiring attorneys and amending
tribal constitutions.
The mechanism for change is twofold: first, and easiest, con-
stitutions and laws should be changed by the tribes in order to
maximize their current self-determination powers. Grants of
Secretarial approval power which are not statutorily required"w
should be eliminated, and other consent provisions should be
clearly limited to the legal minimum, in order to lessen their effect.
The power of the Secretary to disapprove measures "for any
cause" ' should be eliminated, and other consent provisions
should be conditioned on the continued existence of the applicable
federal laws. For instance, the constitution of the Wahpeton Sioux
Tribe now provides that attorney contracts must be approved
only "so long as such approval is required by federal law."' 2 The
proposed new constitution of the Cherokee Nation provides:
"Laws or enactments which are required by Federal statute to be
approved shall be transmitted.., to the President of the United
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States or his authorized representative."" Such amendments
would serve both legal and political purposes. They would im-
mediately increase Indian decision-making power, and remove
any possibility of nonrequired consent power. Further, they
would increase Indian awareness of their right to self-government,
and publicity could draw public and governmental attention to
their insistence on further autonomy. The Secretary has shown his
willingness to approve such amendments to the tribal constitu-
tions by his approval for referendum of the new Cherokee
constitution.'
The next step would be to work for repeal of the various provi-
sions of law that give the Secretary approval power over Indian
decisions." However, care should be taken not to give away too
much. Termination of the consent power should not allow federal
abdication of all responsibility in the decision-making process.
Part of the continuing obligation of the trust responsibility, based
as it is on quasi-contractual principles rather than merely altruistic
concerns for a disadvantaged people,'" is an obligation to continue
to provide support services even after the direct federal authority
is eliminated. The role of the Secretary should change to that of a
counselor and a resource base. One possibility is that the
Secretary could be required to prepare an "impact statement" on
the effects of proposed major tribal decisions,67 particularly those
that affect the land base. The legal staff of the BIA could assist
with the amending of tribal constitutions and counsel individual
Indians on wills and other legal matters. Business advisors could
similarly help with contract matters, appraisals, and the like. The
Indian Self-Determination Act'" illustrates some of the directions
this assistance might take, in its emphasis on the Secretary as a
cooperative advisor rather than administrator."26
While political prediction is risky, it would seem that such pro-
posed legislation would stand a good chance of passage, given the
current government policy of encouraging Indian self-
determination. The elimination of veto authority could be offset
by a requirement of mandatory consultation, at least on major
decisions. It is conceivable that the BIA itself might support the
change because it would eliminate much confrontational pressure
inherent in the present system. In terms of the evolving Indian-
government relationship, it is logical to relinquish control as self-
determination increases. Perhaps there is even some relevance to
the historical guardian-ward concept: as the ward comes of age,
the function of the guardian is less to dictate and more to advise.
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Conclusion
The current Indian-government relationship is characterized by
a pervasive pattern of restraints on Indian decision making. The
broad discretionary power of the Secretary of the Interior should
be reexamined and reformulated to guarantee adherence to the
mandated goals of tribal self-determination and internal
sovereignty. Ideally, the government's role in Indian decision
making should change from one of authority to an advisory
capacity. This can best be achieved through tribal constitutional
amendments and carefully thought out legislative change.
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